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Abstract:	  
Mirror	  neurons	  fire	  both	  when	  executing	  actions	  and	  observing	  others	  perform	  similar	  actions.	  Their	  
sensorimotor	  matching	  properties	  have	  generally	  been	  considered	  a	  genetic	  adaptation	  for	  social	  
cognition;	  however,	  in	  the	  present	  chapter	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  account	  is	  not	  
compelling.	  Instead	  we	  present	  evidence	  supporting	  an	  alternative	  account:	  that	  mirror	  neurons’	  
matching	  properties	  arise	  from	  associative	  learning	  during	  individual	  development.	  Notably,	  this	  
process	  was	  not	  ‘designed’	  by	  genetic	  evolution	  specifically	  to	  produce	  mirror	  neurons,	  but	  just	  
happens	  to	  produce	  them	  when	  the	  developing	  system	  receives	  correlated	  experience	  of	  observing	  
and	  executing	  similar	  actions.	  Sensorimotor	  experience	  with	  non-­‐matching	  actions,	  or	  with	  objects	  
and	  actions,	  is	  hypothesized	  to	  generate	  other	  cell	  types	  in	  the	  same	  regions	  through	  the	  same	  
process.	  The	  associative	  account	  has	  major	  implications	  for	  research	  into	  mirror	  neuron	  function	  and	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Associative	  learning	  theory	  has	  typically	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  behavior	  of	  whole	  animals;	  to	  
understand	  why	  organisms	  make	  particular	  kinds	  of	  responses	  to	  focal	  stimuli	  and	  contextual	  cues.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  use	  research	  on	  associative	  learning	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  way,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
explain	  the	  behavior	  –	  the	  firing	  patterns	  –	  of	  individual	  neurons,	  rather	  than	  whole	  animals.	  	  The	  
neurons	  in	  question	  are	  known	  as	  ‘mirror	  neurons’	  (MNs),	  and	  the	  behavior	  that	  has	  made	  mirror	  
neurons	  famous	  is	  their	  tendency	  to	  fire	  not	  only	  when	  a	  macaque	  performs	  an	  action,	  but	  also	  
when	  the	  macaque	  passively	  observes	  a	  similar	  action	  performed	  by	  another.	  	  Neurons	  with	  this	  
capacity	  to	  match	  observed	  and	  executed	  actions	  were	  originally	  found	  in	  area	  F5	  of	  the	  ventral	  
premotor	  cortex	  (PMC;	  di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992)	  and	  subsequently	  in	  the	  inferior	  parietal	  lobule	  
(IPL;	  Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  of	  the	  macaque	  brain.	  	  A	  substantial	  body	  of	  evidence	  now	  suggests	  that	  
MNs	  are	  also	  present	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  (Molenberghs,	  Cunnington,	  &	  Mattingley,	  2012).	  	  
	  
A	  variety	  of	  functions	  have	  been	  ascribed	  to	  MNs.	  	  Popular	  suggestions	  relate	  to	  action	  
understanding	  (Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2011;	  Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  imitation	  (Iacoboni	  et	  al.,	  1999)	  
and	  language	  processing	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Arbib,	  1998).	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  interest	  has	  also	  been	  generated	  
in	  the	  wider	  scientific	  and	  public	  media:	  MNs	  have	  been	  hailed	  as	  “cells	  that	  read	  minds”	  (Blakesee,	  
2006),	  “the	  neurons	  that	  shaped	  civilization”	  (Ramachandran,	  2009),	  and	  a	  “revolution”	  in	  
understanding	  social	  behavior	  (Iacoboni,	  2008).	  
	  
Whereas	  much	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  theorizing	  and	  speculation	  about	  MN	  functions,	  this	  
chapter’s	  primary	  focus	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  MNs.	  	  We	  ask	  not	  ‘What	  are	  MNs	  for?’,	  but	  ‘What	  is	  the	  
process	  that	  gives	  MNs	  their	  ‘mirrorness’;	  their	  fascinating	  capacity	  to	  match	  observed	  with	  
executed	  actions?’	  	  The	  standard	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  (e.g.	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004)	  is	  
evolution.	  	  The	  ‘adaptation	  account’	  assumes	  that	  the	  mirrorness	  of	  MNs	  was	  produced	  by	  natural	  
selection	  acting	  on	  genetic	  variation.	  	  In	  contrast,	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  evidence	  
supports	  the	  ‘associative	  account’	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Cook	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Heyes,	  2010);	  it	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suggests	  that	  the	  mirrorness	  of	  MNs	  is	  produced	  in	  the	  course	  of	  individual	  development	  by	  
sensorimotor	  associative	  learning.	  	  We	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  associative	  model	  has	  major	  
methodological	  implications	  for	  research	  investigating	  the	  functions	  of	  MNs.	  	  	  
	  
The	  first	  section	  outlines	  key	  background	  information	  regarding	  MNs	  in	  macaques	  and	  humans.	  Next	  
we	  present	  the	  adaptation	  and	  associative	  accounts.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  we	  introduce	  four	  kinds	  
of	  evidence	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  favor	  one	  of	  these	  hypotheses	  over	  the	  other,	  and	  discuss	  
each	  of	  these	  types	  of	  evidence	  in	  turn.	  Finally	  we	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  associative	  
account	  for	  future	  research	  investigating	  the	  functions	  of	  MNs.	  
	  
<A>Mirror	  neuron	  background	  information	  
	  
<B>Where	  are	  they	  found,	  and	  what	  qualifies	  as	  a	  mirror	  neuron?	  
	  
In	  the	  macaque,	  ‘classical’	  MN	  areas	  include	  ventral	  PMC	  and	  IPL	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  However,	  MNs	  have	  
also	  been	  found	  in	  ‘non-­‐classical’	  areas,	  including	  primary	  motor	  cortex	  and	  dorsal	  PMC	  (Dushanova	  
&	  Donoghue,	  2010;	  Tkach,	  Reimer,	  &	  Hatsopoulos,	  2007).	  	  In	  humans,	  there	  is	  evidence	  at	  both	  the	  
single-­‐cell	  and	  population	  level	  of	  neurons	  with	  sensorimotor	  matching	  properties.	  These	  have	  been	  
found	  both	  in	  ‘classical’	  MN	  areas,	  including	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  (IFG;	  considered	  the	  human	  
homologue	  of	  macaque	  F5)	  (Kilner	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  inferior	  parietal	  cortex	  (Chong	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  and	  
in	  non-­‐classical	  areas,	  including	  dorsal	  PMC,	  superior	  parietal	  lobule,	  and	  cerebellum	  (Molenberghs	  
et	  al.,	  2012),	  occipitotemporal	  cortex	  (Oosterhof,	  Tipper,	  &	  Downing,	  2012),	  supplementary	  motor	  
area,	  and	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  (Mukamel	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  




Although	  some	  researchers	  only	  refer	  to	  neurons	  found	  in	  classical	  areas	  as	  MNs	  (e.g.	  Molenberghs	  
et	  al.,	  2012),	  many	  others,	  like	  us,	  use	  the	  term	  ‘MN’	  to	  refer	  to	  neurons	  in	  both	  classical	  and	  non-­‐
classical	  areas	  (Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2011;	  Keysers	  &	  Gazzola,	  2010).	  	  Functional	  definitions	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  a	  MN	  also	  vary.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  term	  ‘MN’	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  neuron	  that	  fires	  
during	  both	  the	  execution	  and	  observation	  of	  action,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  executed	  and	  
observed	  actions	  are	  similar	  to	  one	  another	  (Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004).	  	  In	  
contrast,	  and	  following	  the	  majority	  of	  researchers	  in	  the	  field,	  we	  consider	  that	  MNs’	  ‘mirrorness’	  is	  
defined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  respond	  to	  observation	  and	  execution	  of	  similar	  actions.	  	  However,	  
following	  common	  usage,	  we	  also	  refer	  to	  ‘logically-­‐related’	  MNs	  (see	  following	  subsection),	  which	  
fire	  during	  observation	  and	  execution	  of	  dissimilar	  actions	  which	  have	  some	  functional	  relation,	  as	  
‘MNs’.	  	  	  
	  
<B>Mirror	  neuron	  response	  properties	  in	  the	  macaque	  
	  
Macaque	  MNs	  have	  been	  broadly	  divided	  into	  three	  types	  (Figure	  2),	  based	  on	  their	  field	  properties–	  
the	  sensory	  and	  motoric	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  fire:	  ‘Strictly	  congruent’	  MNs	  discharge	  during	  
observation	  and	  execution	  of	  the	  same	  action,	  for	  example,	  a	  ‘precision’	  grip	  made	  with	  thumb	  and	  
index	  finger.	  	  ‘Broadly	  congruent’	  MNs	  fire	  during	  the	  execution	  of	  one	  action	  (e.g.,	  precision	  grip)	  
and	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  one	  or	  more	  similar,	  but	  not	  identical,	  actions	  (e.g.,	  only	  power	  grip;	  
or	  multiple	  actions	  e.g.	  precision	  grip,	  power	  grip,	  and	  grasping	  with	  the	  mouth).	  	  So-­‐called	  ‘logically-­‐
related’	  MNs	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992)	  respond	  to	  different	  actions	  in	  observe	  and	  execute	  
conditions.	  	  For	  example,	  they	  fire	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  an	  experimenter	  placing	  food	  in	  front	  of	  
the	  monkey,	  and	  when	  the	  monkey	  executes	  a	  grasp	  on	  the	  food	  in	  order	  to	  eat	  it	  (it	  is	  likely	  that	  
cells	  with	  these	  properties	  were	  dubbed	  ‘logically-­‐related’,	  not	  because	  there	  is	  a	  formal	  relationship	  
between	  their	  eliciting	  conditions,	  but	  to	  acknowledge	  that,	  unlike	  other	  MNs,	  they	  do	  not	  match	  or	  
‘mirror’	  observed	  and	  executed	  actions).	  	  MNs	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  presentation	  of	  objects	  alone	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(di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  	  However,	  ‘canonical	  neurons’,	  which	  are	  active	  during	  object	  observation	  
and	  also	  during	  execution	  of	  an	  action	  that	  is	  commonly	  performed	  on	  that	  object,	  are	  located	  
alongside	  MNs	  in	  both	  premotor	  and	  parietal	  areas	  (Murata	  et	  al.,	  1997,	  2000).	  	  
	  
[Figure	  2	  near	  here]	  
	  
Macaque	  MNs	  fire	  during	  execution	  and	  observation	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  hand	  and	  mouth	  actions.	  
The	  hand	  actions	  include	  grasping,	  placing,	  manipulating	  with	  the	  fingers	  and	  holding	  (di	  Pellegrino	  
et	  al.,	  1992).	  The	  mouth	  actions	  include	  ingestive	  behaviors	  such	  as	  breaking	  food	  items,	  chewing	  
and	  sucking,	  and	  communicative	  gestures	  such	  as	  lip-­‐smacking,	  lip-­‐protrusion	  and	  tongue-­‐protrusion	  
(Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  
	  
<B>Mirror	  neurons	  in	  humans	  
	  
Only	  one	  study	  offers	  single	  cell	  recording	  evidence	  of	  MNs	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  (Mukamel	  et	  al.,	  
2010).	  However,	  a	  considerable	  body	  of	  evidence	  from	  neuroimaging,	  transcranial	  magnetic	  
stimulation	  (TMS),	  and	  behavioral	  studies,	  summarized	  in	  the	  following	  subsections,	  suggests	  that	  
human	  brains	  contain	  MNs	  or	  comparable	  ‘mirror	  mechanisms’	  (Glenberg,	  2011;	  referred	  to	  
throughout	  this	  chapter	  as	  MNs).	  	  
	  
Functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  (fMRI)	  has	  identified	  regions	  of	  PMC	  and	  inferior	  parietal	  
areas	  that	  respond	  during	  both	  action	  observation	  and	  execution	  (Gazzola	  &	  Keysers,	  2009;	  Iacoboni	  
et	  al.,	  1999;	  Vogt	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  More	  recently,	  ‘repetition	  suppression’	  effects,	  whereby	  the	  neural	  
response	  reduces	  when	  events	  activating	  the	  same	  neuronal	  population	  are	  repeated,	  (Grill-­‐Spector,	  
Henson,	  &	  Martin,	  2006)	  provide	  further	  evidence	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘mirror’	  neuronal	  populations.	  	  
Action	  observation	  followed	  by	  execution	  of	  the	  same	  action,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  elicits	  a	  suppressed	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response	  in	  inferior	  parietal	  regions	  (Chong	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Lingnau,	  Gesierich,	  &	  Caramazza,	  2009)	  and	  
in	  PMC	  (Kilner	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Lingnau	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  indicating	  that	  the	  same	  neuronal	  population	  is	  
active	  when	  observing	  and	  executing	  the	  same	  action.	  Multivariate	  pattern	  analysis	  (MVPA)	  has	  also	  
revealed	  cross-­‐modal	  action-­‐specific	  representations	  consistent	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘mirror’	  
neuronal	  populations	  (Oosterhof	  et	  al.,	  2012):	  a	  ‘classifier’	  program	  trained	  to	  discriminate	  neural	  
responses	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  different	  actions	  can	  subsequently,	  when	  tested	  with	  neural	  responses	  
to	  the	  observation	  of	  those	  actions,	  detect	  which	  action	  was	  observed,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  same	  
neural	  representations	  encode	  action	  observation	  and	  execution.	  
	  
‘Mirror’	  patterns	  of	  motor-­‐evoked	  potentials	  (MEPs)	  further	  suggest	  a	  human	  mirror	  mechanism	  
(Fadiga	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  When	  TMS	  is	  applied	  to	  M1	  during	  passive	  action	  observation,	  the	  amplitude	  of	  
MEPs	  recorded	  from	  the	  muscles	  required	  to	  execute	  that	  action	  increases.	  For	  example,	  observing	  
index	  and	  little	  finger	  movements	  selectively	  facilitates	  the	  amplitude	  of	  MEPs	  recorded	  from	  the	  
muscles	  responsible	  for	  index	  and	  little	  finger	  movements	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  That	  action	  
observation	  selectively	  increases	  corticospinal	  excitability	  to	  action	  relevant	  muscles	  is	  suggestive	  of	  
‘mirror’	  sensorimotor	  connectivity.	  	  
	  
Behaviorally,	  automatic	  imitation	  occurs	  when	  observation	  of	  an	  action	  involuntarily	  facilitates	  
performance	  of	  a	  topographically	  similar	  action	  and/or	  interferes	  with	  performance	  of	  a	  
topographically	  dissimilar	  action	  (Brass,	  Bekkering,	  &	  Prinz,	  2001;	  Stürmer,	  Aschersleben,	  &	  Prinz,	  
2000).	  	  Humans	  show	  robust	  automatic	  imitation	  when	  they	  observe	  hand,	  arm,	  foot	  and	  mouth	  
movements	  (Heyes,	  2011).	  	  This	  is	  regarded	  by	  many	  researchers	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  human	  mirror	  
mechanism	  (Ferrari,	  Bonini,	  &	  Fogassi,	  2009;	  Iacoboni,	  2009;	  Kilner,	  Paulignan,	  &	  Blakemore,	  2003).	  	  
	  




Here	  we	  outline	  the	  standard,	  adaptation	  account	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  MNs,	  and	  the	  alternative	  
associative	  account.	  	  Both	  accounts	  assume	  that	  genetic	  information	  and	  experience	  contribute	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  MNs.	  	  They	  differ	  in	  the	  roles	  they	  assign	  to	  genetic	  evolution	  and	  to	  learning	  in	  
producing	  MNs’	  characteristic	  matching	  properties.	  	  	  
	  
The	  adaptation	  account	  suggests	  that	  the	  matching	  properties	  of	  MNs	  are	  an	  adaptation	  for	  action	  
understanding	  and/or	  related	  social	  cognitive	  abilities	  (the	  term	  ‘adaptation’	  is	  used	  here	  to	  describe	  
a	  phenotypic	  characteristic	  that	  is	  genetically	  inherited,	  and	  that	  was	  favored	  by	  natural	  selection	  to	  
fulfill	  a	  particular	  function	  or	  ‘purpose’;	  Williams,	  1966).	  	  	  Specifically,	  the	  adaptation	  account	  
assumes	  that	  among	  common	  ancestors	  of	  macaques	  and	  humans,	  some	  individuals	  had	  a	  stronger	  
genetic	  predisposition	  to	  develop	  MNs	  with	  matching	  properties,	  and	  that	  these	  individuals	  were	  
more	  reproductively	  successful	  than	  those	  with	  a	  weaker	  genetic	  predisposition	  because	  the	  
development	  of	  MNs	  enhanced	  their	  capacity	  to	  understand	  others’	  actions.	  	  Consequently,	  a	  
genetic	  predisposition	  to	  develop	  MNs	  became	  universal,	  or	  nearly	  universal,	  in	  macaques	  and	  
humans.	  	  The	  adaptation	  account	  further	  suggests	  that	  motor	  experience	  (executing	  actions)	  and/or	  
visual	  experience	  (observing	  actions)	  plays	  a	  facilitative	  or	  ‘triggering’	  (Gottlieb,	  1976;	  Ariew,	  2006)	  
role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  MNs,	  but	  their	  ‘mirror’,	  sensory-­‐to-­‐motor	  matching	  properties	  are	  due	  to	  
this	  genetic	  predisposition.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  adaptation	  account	  has	  largely	  been	  set	  out	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  ‘evolution’	  of	  MNs	  (Gallese	  &	  
Goldman,	  1998;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Arbib,	  1998;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004;	  Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  For	  
example,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  “the	  mirror	  neuron	  mechanism	  is	  a	  mechanism	  of	  great	  evolutionary	  
importance	  through	  which	  primates	  understand	  actions	  done	  by	  their	  conspecifics”	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  
Craighero,	  2004,	  p.	  172).	  	  A	  number	  of	  discussions	  have	  also	  suggested	  that	  MNs	  are	  present	  at	  birth	  
(Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Lepage	  &	  Theoret,	  2007;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Fadiga,	  1998),	  a	  




In	  contrast,	  the	  associative	  account	  suggests	  that	  the	  matching	  properties	  of	  MNs	  are	  not	  a	  product	  
of	  a	  specific	  genetic	  predisposition,	  but	  instead	  result	  from	  domain-­‐general	  processes	  of	  associative	  
learning	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Cook	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Heyes,	  2010).	  	  Associative	  learning	  is	  found	  in	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  vertebrate	  and	  invertebrate	  species,	  indicating	  that	  it	  is	  an	  evolutionarily	  ancient	  and	  
highly	  conserved	  adaptation	  for	  tracking	  predictive	  relationships	  between	  events	  (Heyes,	  2012;	  
Schultz	  &	  Dickinson,	  2000).	  	  	  
	  
[Figure	  3	  near	  here]	  
	  
Figure	  3	  represents	  a	  theory	  (Heyes	  &	  Ray,	  2000;	  Heyes,	  2010)	  of	  how	  MNs	  might	  acquire	  their	  
matching	  properties	  through	  sensorimotor	  associative	  learning.	  	  Before	  associative	  learning,	  sensory	  
neurons	  responsive	  to	  different	  high-­‐level	  visual	  properties	  of	  observed	  action	  (Oram	  &	  Perrett,	  
1994,	  1996)	  are	  weakly	  connected,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  to	  motor	  neurons	  in	  parietal	  cortex	  (Gallese	  
et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  PMC	  (Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1988).	  	  Although	  some	  of	  these	  connections	  may	  be	  stronger	  
than	  others,	  the	  links	  between	  sensory	  and	  motor	  neurons	  coding	  similar	  actions	  are	  not	  
consistently	  stronger	  than	  other,	  nonmatching	  links.	  	  Correlated	  (i.e.	  contiguous	  and	  contingent)	  
excitation	  of	  sensory	  and	  motor	  neurons	  that	  code	  similar	  actions	  produces	  MNs.	  	  For	  example,	  
when	  an	  adult	  imitates	  an	  infant’s	  facial	  movements,	  there	  might	  be	  correlated	  excitation	  of	  
neurons	  that	  are	  responsive	  to	  the	  observation	  and	  execution	  of	  lip	  protrusion.	  	  Correlated	  
excitation	  of	  the	  sensory	  and	  motor	  neurons	  increases	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  
them,	  so	  that	  subsequent	  excitation	  of	  the	  sensory	  neuron	  propagates	  to	  the	  motor	  neuron.	  	  
Thereafter,	  the	  motor	  neuron	  fires,	  not	  only	  during	  execution	  of	  lip	  protrusion,	  but	  also	  during	  
observation	  of	  lip	  protrusion,	  via	  its	  connection	  with	  the	  sensory	  neuron;	  what	  was	  originally	  a	  
motor	  neuron	  has	  become	  a	  lip	  protrusion	  MN.	  In	  humans,	  there	  are	  many	  possible	  sources	  of	  
correlated	  excitation	  of	  sensory	  and	  motor	  neurons	  encoding	  the	  same	  action.	  It	  occurs	  not	  only	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when	  we	  are	  imitated,	  but	  also	  when	  we	  observe	  our	  own	  actions	  –	  directly	  or	  using	  an	  optical	  
mirror;	  observe	  others	  during	  synchronous	  activities	  –	  e.g.	  in	  sports	  and	  dance	  training;	  and	  via	  
‘acquired	  equivalence’	  experience,	  for	  example,	  when	  the	  same	  sound	  (a	  word,	  or	  a	  sound	  produced	  
by	  an	  action,	  e.g.	  lip-­‐smacking)	  is	  paired	  sometimes	  with	  observation	  of	  an	  action	  and	  sometimes	  
with	  its	  execution	  (Ray	  &	  Heyes,	  2011).	  	  In	  all	  of	  these	  situations,	  motor	  activity	  is	  not	  initiated	  by,	  
but	  it	  is	  correlated	  with,	  observation	  of	  matching	  actions.	  	  	  
	  
Thus	  the	  associative	  account	  identifies	  sources	  in	  everyday	  life	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  correlated	  
sensorimotor	  experience	  necessary	  for	  MN	  development,	  and	  many	  of	  these	  sources	  are	  
sociocultural;	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  MNs	  are	  built	  through	  social	  interaction.	  	  Another	  important	  point	  to	  
note	  about	  the	  associative	  account	  is	  its	  emphasis	  on	  contingency.	  	  Following	  contemporary	  
associative	  learning	  theory,	  it	  anticipates	  that	  the	  mature	  properties	  of	  MNs	  will	  covary,	  not	  only	  
with	  the	  number	  of	  occasions	  on	  which	  observation	  of	  an	  action	  has	  been	  paired	  with	  its	  execution	  
(contiguity),	  but	  also,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  context	  blocking,	  with	  the	  relative	  predictiveness	  of	  observation	  
for	  execution,	  or	  vice	  versa	  (contingency;	  Cook	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  Experiments	  testing	  the	  associative	  
account	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
	  
In	  summary:	  the	  associative	  account	  implies	  that	  the	  characteristic,	  matching	  properties	  of	  MNs	  
result	  from	  a	  genetically	  evolved	  process,	  associative	  learning,	  but	  that	  this	  process	  was	  not	  
‘designed’	  by	  genetic	  evolution	  specifically	  to	  produce	  matching	  MNs.	  	  It	  just	  happens	  to	  produce	  
matching	  MNs	  when	  the	  developing	  system	  receives	  correlated	  experience	  of	  observing	  and	  
executing	  similar	  actions.	  	  When	  the	  system	  receives	  correlated	  experience	  of	  observing	  objects	  and	  
executing	  actions,	  the	  same	  associative	  process	  produces	  canonical	  neurons.	  When	  the	  system	  
receives	  correlated	  experience	  of	  observing	  one	  action	  and	  executing	  a	  different	  action,	  the	  same	  




Thus,	  the	  adaptation	  account	  says	  that	  genetic	  evolution	  has	  played	  a	  specific	  and	  decisive	  role,	  and	  
learning	  plays	  a	  merely	  facilitative	  role,	  in	  the	  development	  of	  matching	  MNs.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  
associative	  account	  says	  that	  evolution	  has	  played	  a	  non-­‐specific	  background	  role,	  and	  that	  the	  
characteristic	  matching	  properties	  of	  MNs	  are	  forged	  or	  ‘induced’	  (Gottlieb,	  1976)	  by	  sensorimotor	  
learning.	  	  	  
	  
<A>Distinguishing	  the	  adaptation	  and	  associative	  accounts	  
	  
Here	  we	  present	  the	  four	  evidence-­‐based	  arguments	  which	  aid	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  
adaptation	  and	  associative	  accounts.	  	  The	  first	  argument	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  adaptation	  
account.	  	  It	  suggests	  that	  examination	  of	  the	  field	  properties	  of	  MNs	  –	  and,	  in	  particular,	  their	  ‘goal’	  
coding	  –	  forces	  the	  conclusion	  that	  MNs	  are	  ‘designed’	  (Williams,	  1966)	  for	  action	  understanding.	  In	  
the	  following	  subsection	  we	  examine	  the	  field	  properties	  of	  MNs	  and	  suggest	  that	  this	  argument	  is	  
not	  compelling.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  argument	  suggests	  that	  research	  using	  conditioning	  procedures	  shows	  associative	  
learning	  to	  be	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  learning	  to	  produce	  MNs.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  associative	  
learning	  tracks	  contingent	  relationships,	  and	  enables	  contextual	  modulation	  of	  these	  connections,	  
makes	  it	  apt	  to	  produce	  MNs	  (and	  non-­‐matching	  visuomotor	  neurons)	  in	  typical	  developmental	  
environments.	  	  
	  
We	  then	  draw	  on	  research	  examining	  the	  development	  of	  MNs	  and	  their	  modification	  through	  
sensorimotor	  experience.	  	  First	  we	  discuss	  research	  with	  infants	  and	  adults	  that	  has	  been	  used	  to	  
support	  a	  “poverty	  of	  the	  stimulus”	  argument	  (Chomsky,	  1975);	  to	  suggest	  that	  MNs	  emerge	  too	  
early	  in	  development,	  after	  too	  little	  sensorimotor	  experience,	  to	  have	  been	  forged	  by	  associative	  




Finally,	  we	  focus	  on	  evidence	  that,	  even	  in	  adulthood,	  the	  properties	  of	  MNs	  can	  be	  changed	  in	  
radical	  ways	  by	  relatively	  brief	  periods	  of	  sensorimotor	  experience.	  	  This	  evidence	  supports	  the	  
associative	  account	  in	  two	  ways:	  it	  confirms	  novel	  predictions	  of	  the	  associative	  account,	  and	  
indicates	  that	  the	  development	  of	  MNs	  is	  not	  buffered	  or	  protected	  from	  perturbation	  in	  the	  way	  
one	  would	  expect	  if	  MNs	  were	  an	  adaptation	  for	  action	  understanding.	  	  
	  
<B>Do	  mirror	  neurons	  encode	  the	  ‘goal’	  of	  an	  action?	  
	  
Supporters	  of	  the	  adaptation	  account	  (e.g.,	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010)	  argue	  that	  examination	  of	  
the	  field	  properties	  of	  MNs	  indicates	  that	  they	  encode	  ‘goals’.	  They	  further	  argue	  that	  this	  property	  
suggests	  that	  MNs	  evolved	  to	  mediate	  action	  understanding.	  	  We	  first,	  therefore,	  consider	  how	  well	  
the	  neurophysiological	  data	  accord	  with	  this	  view.	  	  The	  term	  ‘goal’	  has	  numerous	  interpretations	  
(Hickok,	  2009).	  	  We	  will	  consider	  two	  commonly	  adopted	  definitions,	  assuming	  that	  MNs	  encode	  
‘goals’	  if	  they	  encode	  (1)	  object-­‐directed	  actions	  or	  (2)	  high-­‐level	  action	  intentions.	  	  
	  
Early	  descriptions	  of	  MN	  field	  properties	  reported	  that	  intransitive,	  that	  is	  non-­‐object-­‐directed,	  
actions	  (e.g.	  tongue-­‐protrusion)	  and	  pantomimed	  actions	  (e.g.	  miming	  a	  precision	  grip	  without	  an	  
object)	  did	  not	  elicit	  MN	  responses	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  In	  contrast,	  robust	  
responses	  were	  reported	  when	  monkeys	  observed	  object-­‐directed	  actions.	  This	  pattern	  raises	  the	  
possibility	  that	  MNs	  encode	  ‘goals’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  responsive	  only	  to	  object-­‐directed	  
actions.	  	  However,	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  single	  cell	  data	  suggests	  that	  only	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  MNs	  
appear	  to	  encode	  action	  goals	  in	  these	  terms.	  	  A	  subset	  of	  the	  MNs	  described	  in	  the	  early	  reports	  
continued	  to	  respond,	  albeit	  less	  strongly,	  to	  pantomimed	  or	  intransitive	  actions	  (di	  Pellegrino	  et	  al.,	  
1992;	  Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996	  Figure	  5b).	  Subsequent	  studies	  confirmed	  that	  sizable	  proportions,	  
perhaps	  the	  majority,	  of	  MNs	  exhibit	  robust	  responses	  to	  the	  observation	  of	  object-­‐free	  body	  
13	  
	  
movements,	  such	  as	  lip-­‐smacking,	  lip-­‐protrusion	  and	  tongue-­‐protrusion	  (Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Also,	  as	  
reported	  by	  Kraskov	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  73%	  of	  MN	  responses	  modulated	  by	  observation	  of	  object-­‐
directed	  grasping	  showed	  similar	  modulation	  during	  observation	  of	  pantomimed	  grasping.	  	  	  
	  
As	  well	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  object	  of	  an	  action,	  the	  term	  ‘goal’	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  the	  
actor	  intends	  to	  achieve	  –	  for	  example,	  “grasp	  in	  order	  to	  eat”	  (Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  or	  “taking	  
possession	  of	  an	  object”	  (Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  Rizzolatti	  and	  Sinigaglia	  (2010,	  p.	  269)	  state:	  “only	  
those	  [neurons]	  that	  can	  encode	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  motor	  behaviour	  of	  another	  individual	  with	  the	  
greatest	  degree	  of	  generality	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  crucial	  for	  action	  understanding”.	  	  The	  
suggestion	  that	  MNs	  encode	  high-­‐level	  action	  intentions	  is	  consistent	  with	  reports	  that	  some	  broadly	  
congruent	  MNs	  respond	  to	  the	  observation	  of	  multiple	  actions;	  for	  example	  any	  ‘grasping’	  action	  
executed	  with	  the	  hand	  or	  mouth	  (Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  It	  is	  also	  made	  plausible	  by	  reports	  that	  MN	  
responses	  to	  grasping	  can	  be	  modulated	  by	  the	  final	  outcome	  of	  the	  motor	  sequence	  (Bonini	  et	  al.,	  
2010;	  Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  single	  cell	  data	  again	  suggest	  that	  relatively	  few	  MNs	  have	  the	  field	  properties	  one	  
would	  expect	  of	  a	  system	  designed	  to	  represent	  high-­‐level	  action	  intentions.	  For	  example,	  Gallese	  et	  
al.	  (1996)	  reported	  that	  during	  action	  observation	  37.5%	  of	  MNs	  responded	  differently	  depending	  on	  
whether	  the	  action	  was	  executed	  with	  the	  left	  or	  right	  hand,	  and	  64%	  showed	  direction	  sensitivity,	  
preferring	  either	  left-­‐to-­‐right	  or	  right-­‐to-­‐left	  grasping	  actions.	  Similarly,	  many	  MNs	  (53%)	  respond	  
selectively	  to	  the	  observation	  of	  actions	  executed	  within	  (‘peripersonal’	  MNs)	  or	  beyond	  
(‘extrapersonal’	  MNs),	  not	  the	  actor’s,	  but	  the	  observing	  monkey’s	  reach	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  
majority	  (74%)	  of	  MNs	  also	  exhibit	  view-­‐dependent	  responses;	  some	  MNs	  are	  tuned	  to	  egocentric	  
(first-­‐person)	  presentation,	  while	  others	  respond	  maximally	  to	  allocentric	  (third-­‐person)	  
perspectives	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Each	  of	  these	  classes	  of	  MN	  is	  sensitive	  to	  features	  of	  action	  
that	  fall	  well	  below	  the	  “greatest	  degree	  of	  generality”,	  and	  of	  intentions	  such	  as	  “grasping	  in	  order	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to	  eat”	  or	  “taking	  possession	  of	  an	  object”.	  	  
	  
<B>Associative	  learning:	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  learning	  to	  generate	  mirror	  neuron	  field	  properties?	  
	  
The	  previous	  subsection	  suggested	  that	  many	  MNs	  have	  field	  properties	  incompatible	  with	  the	  
hypothesis	  that	  they	  were	  designed	  by	  evolution	  to	  mediate	  action	  understanding	  via	  goal	  coding.	  	  
Here,	  in	  complementary	  fashion,	  we	  argue	  that	  research	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  contingency	  and	  contextual	  
modulation	  in	  associative	  learning	  enables	  the	  associative	  account	  to	  provide	  a	  unified	  explanation	  
of	  all	  MN	  field	  properties	  reported	  to	  date.	  	  
	  
Associative	  learning	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  contiguity	  –	  events	  occurring	  close	  together	  in	  space	  and	  
time	  –	  but	  also	  on	  contingency:	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  event	  reliably	  predicts	  the	  other	  (Elsner	  &	  
Hommel,	  2004;	  Rescorla,	  1968;	  Schultz	  &	  Dickinson,	  2000).	  The	  associative	  account	  therefore	  
anticipates	  that	  MNs	  will	  acquire	  sensorimotor	  matching	  properties	  only	  when	  an	  individual	  
experiences	  systematic	  contingencies	  between	  sensory	  events	  and	  performed	  actions	  (Cooper	  et	  al.,	  
2013).	  This	  feature	  of	  associative	  learning	  ensures	  that	  the	  matching	  properties	  of	  MNs	  reflect	  
sensorimotor	  relationships	  that	  occur	  reliably	  in	  the	  individual’s	  environment,	  rather	  than	  chance	  
co-­‐occurrences.	  Cook	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  described	  evidence	  that	  the	  human	  mirror	  mechanism	  is	  
modified	  by	  contingent	  but	  not	  by	  non-­‐contingent	  sensorimotor	  experience.	  
	  
Sensitivity	  to	  contingency	  explains	  the	  mix	  of	  strictly-­‐congruent	  MNs,	  sensitive	  to	  the	  low-­‐level	  
features	  of	  observed	  actions	  (type	  of	  grip,	  effector	  used,	  direction	  of	  movement,	  view-­‐point,	  
proximity	  to	  the	  observer),	  and	  broadly-­‐congruent	  MNs,	  responsive	  to	  multiple	  related	  actions	  
irrespective	  of	  the	  manner	  of	  their	  execution.	  Both	  visual	  and	  motor	  systems	  are	  known	  to	  be	  
organized	  hierarchically	  (Jeannerod,	  1994;	  Perrett	  et	  al.,	  1989),	  comprising	  different	  populations	  
encoding	  relatively	  low-­‐level	  (e.g.,	  descriptions	  of	  particular	  ‘precision’	  or	  ‘power’	  grips)	  and	  more	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abstract	  representations	  (e.g.,	  descriptions	  of	  ‘grasping’).	  Crucially,	  contingencies	  can	  be	  
experienced	  between	  both	  low-­‐	  and	  high-­‐level	  sensory	  and	  motor	  representations.	  When	  a	  monkey	  
observes	  itself	  performing	  a	  precision	  grip,	  the	  excitation	  of	  sensory	  and	  motor	  populations	  
encoding	  a	  specific	  grip	  (low-­‐level)	  are	  correlated.	  However,	  during	  group	  feeding,	  a	  monkey	  might	  
observe	  and	  perform	  a	  range	  of	  grasping	  actions,	  thereby	  causing	  correlated	  excitation	  of	  higher-­‐
level	  visual	  and	  motoric	  descriptions	  of	  grasping.	  Contingency	  sensitivity	  therefore	  explains	  the	  
existence	  of	  both	  strictly-­‐congruent	  MNs,	  tuned	  to	  a	  particular	  sensory	  representation	  (e.g.	  a	  right-­‐
to-­‐left	  precision	  grip	  executed	  with	  the	  right	  hand	  viewed	  allocentrically	  in	  extrapersonal	  space),	  and	  
broadly	  congruent	  MNs,	  responsive	  to	  the	  observation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  related	  actions	  (see	  Figure	  4).	  	  
	  
[Figure	  4	  near	  here]	  
	  
Contingency	  sensitivity	  also	  explains	  other	  MN	  properties.	  According	  to	  the	  associative	  account,	  
MNs	  acquire	  sensorimotor	  properties	  whenever	  individuals	  experience	  a	  contingency	  between	  
‘seeing’	  and	  ‘doing’.	  Crucially,	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  that	  contingencies	  be	  between	  action	  
execution	  and	  observation	  of	  the	  same	  action.	  Both	  monkeys	  and	  humans	  frequently	  experience	  
non-­‐matching	  sensorimotor	  contingencies,	  where	  the	  observation	  of	  one	  action	  predicts	  the	  
execution	  of	  another;	  for	  example,	  you	  release	  and	  I	  grasp	  (Newman-­‐Norlund	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  
associative	  account	  therefore	  explains	  the	  existence	  of	  logically-­‐related	  MNs	  that	  respond	  to	  
different	  actions	  in	  observe	  and	  execute	  conditions.	  Equally,	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  that	  
contingencies	  be	  between	  action	  execution	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  ‘natural’	  action-­‐related	  stimuli,	  
such	  as	  the	  sight	  of	  animate	  motion	  or	  sounds	  that	  could	  have	  been	  heard	  by	  ancestors	  of	  
contemporary	  monkeys.	  Thus	  the	  associative	  account	  explains	  why	  ‘tool-­‐use’	  MNs	  (Ferrari,	  Rozzi,	  &	  
Fogassi,	  2005)	  develop	  when	  action	  execution	  (e.g.	  grasping	  a	  food	  item)	  is	  reliably	  predicted	  by	  the	  
sight	  of	  actions	  performed	  with	  tools	  (e.g.	  seeing	  food	  items	  being	  gripped	  with	  pliers),	  and	  why	  
‘audiovisual’	  MNs	  (Keysers	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Kohler	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  develop	  when	  action	  performance	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predicts	  characteristic	  action	  sounds	  (e.g.	  paper	  tearing	  or	  plastic	  crumpling)	  (Cook,	  2012):	  there	  is	  a	  
high	  contingency	  between	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  experimenter	  gripping	  food	  with	  pliers	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  execution	  of	  a	  grasp	  by	  the	  macaque;	  and	  between	  the	  sound	  of	  paper	  tearing	  and	  the	  
execution	  of	  the	  ripping	  action	  that	  produces	  that	  sound.	  	  
	  
Studies	  of	  conditioning	  that	  have	  supported	  the	  role	  of	  contingency	  indicate	  that	  learned	  responses	  
acquired	  under	  contingency	  control	  are	  often	  also	  subject	  to	  contextual	  control;	  if	  a	  stimulus	  is	  
associated	  with	  two	  responses,	  each	  in	  a	  different	  context,	  then	  the	  context	  determines	  which	  
association,	  representing	  a	  response-­‐outcome	  contingency,	  is	  cued	  by	  the	  stimulus	  (Bouton,	  1993,	  
1994;	  Peck	  &	  Bouton,	  1990).	  For	  example,	  Peck	  and	  Bouton	  (1990)	  initially	  placed	  rats	  in	  a	  
conditioning	  chamber	  with	  a	  distinctive	  scent	  (e.g.,	  coconut)	  where	  they	  learned	  to	  expect	  electric	  
shock	  following	  a	  tone.	  The	  rats	  were	  then	  transferred	  to	  a	  second	  chamber	  with	  a	  different	  scent	  
(e.g.,	  aniseed)	  where	  the	  same	  tone	  predicted	  the	  delivery	  of	  food.	  The	  rats	  quickly	  learned	  the	  new	  
contingency	  and	  conditioned	  foraging	  responses	  replaced	  conditioned	  freezing.	  However,	  learning	  in	  
the	  second	  phase	  was	  context	  dependent.	  When	  returned	  to	  the	  first	  chamber,	  or	  transferred	  to	  a	  
third	  chamber	  with	  a	  novel	  scent,	  the	  tone	  once	  again	  elicited	  freezing.	  The	  associative	  account	  of	  
MN	  properties	  draws	  on	  the	  components	  of	  associative	  learning	  theory	  that	  explain	  this	  kind	  of	  
effect.	  	  
	  
Using	  associative	  learning	  theory	  in	  this	  way,	  several	  findings	  from	  the	  MN	  literature	  can	  be	  
interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  contextual	  modulation	  of	  MN	  firing	  (Cook,	  Dickinson,	  &	  Heyes,	  2012).	  For	  
example,	  some	  MNs	  show	  stronger	  visual	  responses	  to	  object-­‐directed	  grasping	  than	  to	  
pantomimed	  grasping	  in	  object-­‐absent	  contexts	  (Gallese	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  
modulating	  influence	  of	  the	  object-­‐context	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  when	  the	  target	  object	  is	  occluded	  
prior	  to	  contact	  with	  the	  hand	  (Umilta	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Similarly,	  MN	  responses	  during	  the	  observation	  
of	  grasping	  may	  be	  modulated	  by	  the	  type	  of	  object	  being	  grasped	  (Caggiano	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  with	  some	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MNs	  responding	  strongly	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  high-­‐value	  objects	  (food,	  non-­‐food	  objects	  predictive	  of	  
reward),	  and	  some	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  low-­‐value	  objects	  (non-­‐food	  objects	  not	  associated	  with	  
reward).	  	  In	  the	  clearest	  example,	  the	  same	  motor	  act,	  grasping	  with	  a	  precision	  grip,	  elicits	  different	  
MN	  responses	  dependent	  on	  whether	  the	  action	  is	  observed	  in	  the	  presence	  (“grasp	  to	  place”)	  or	  
absence	  (“grasp	  to	  eat”)	  of	  a	  plastic	  cup	  (Bonini	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Fogassi	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Rather	  than	  the	  
plastic	  cup	  providing	  a	  cue	  to	  the	  actor’s	  intention,	  it	  may	  act	  as	  an	  associatively	  generated	  
contextual	  cue	  modulating	  the	  operation	  of	  two	  associations.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  
tone	  elicited	  different	  behaviors	  when	  presented	  in	  the	  coconut	  and	  aniseed	  contexts	  (Peck	  &	  
Bouton,	  1990),	  observing	  a	  precision	  grip	  may	  excite	  different	  MNs	  in	  the	  cup-­‐present	  and	  cup-­‐
absent	  contexts	  (see	  Figure	  4).	  	  Thus,	  while	  many	  of	  the	  field	  properties	  described	  above	  are	  
frequently	  cited	  as	  evidence	  of	  goal	  (intention)	  coding	  by	  MNs,	  they	  are	  equally	  consistent	  with	  
contextual	  modulation	  within	  an	  associative	  framework.	  
	  
<B>Sufficient	  opportunity	  for	  learning	  before	  mirror	  neurons	  emerge?	  
	  
MNs	  have	  not	  been	  measured	  directly	  in	  neonates.	  However,	  other	  research	  involving	  infants	  has	  
been	  used	  to	  support	  a	  “poverty	  of	  the	  stimulus”	  (Chomsky,	  1975)	  argument	  suggesting	  that	  MNs	  
emerge	  too	  early	  in	  development,	  after	  too	  little	  sensorimotor	  experience,	  to	  have	  been	  forged	  by	  
associative	  learning.	  Specifically,	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  imitation	  is	  mediated	  by	  MNs,	  and	  that	  
both	  human	  and	  macaque	  infants	  are	  able	  to	  imitate	  when	  they	  have	  had	  minimal	  opportunity	  for	  
sensorimotor	  learning.	  	  However,	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  second	  claim	  is	  not	  compelling.	  	  
Building	  on	  previous	  analyses	  (e.g.	  Anisfeld,	  1996),	  a	  recent	  review	  found	  evidence	  that	  human	  
neonates	  ‘copy’	  only	  one	  action	  –	  tongue	  protrusion	  –	  and	  that,	  since	  tongue	  protrusion	  occurs	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  range	  of	  arousing	  stimuli,	  this	  ‘copying’	  does	  not	  show	  the	  specificity	  that	  is	  




Turning	  to	  macaque	  infants,	  Ferrari	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  reported	  immediate	  imitation	  of	  tongue	  protrusion	  
and	  lip-­‐smacking	  in	  3	  day-­‐old	  macaques.	  	  However,	  the	  effects	  were	  not	  present	  on	  days	  1,	  7	  and	  14	  
postpartum,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  they	  were	  replicated	  in	  a	  subsequent	  study	  (Paukner,	  Ferrari,	  
&	  Suomi,	  2011).	  	  The	  later	  study	  did	  report	  imitation	  of	  lip-­‐smacking	  in	  macaques	  less	  than	  one	  week	  
old,	  but	  this	  effect	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  due	  to	  a	  low	  frequency	  of	  lip-­‐smacking	  in	  the	  control	  
condition,	  rather	  than	  to	  an	  elevated	  frequency	  of	  lip-­‐smacking	  when	  the	  infants	  were	  observing	  lip-­‐
smacking.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  common	  with	  the	  data	  from	  human	  infants,	  studies	  of	  imitation	  in	  newborn	  
macaques	  do	  not	  currently	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  infants	  can	  imitate	  before	  they	  have	  had	  the	  
opportunity	  for	  relevant	  sensorimotor	  learning.	  	  
	  
A	  related	  argument	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  associative	  account	  must	  be	  wrong	  because	  suppression	  
of	  electroencephalographic	  (EEG)	  activity	  in	  the	  alpha	  frequency	  range	  (~6-­‐13	  Hz)	  during	  action	  
observation	  (and	  execution)	  reflects	  the	  operation	  of	  MNs;	  and	  that	  both	  human	  and	  macaque	  
infants	  show	  alpha	  suppression	  when	  they	  have	  had	  minimal	  opportunity	  for	  sensorimotor	  learning.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  both	  of	  the	  claims	  are	  weak.	  	  Alpha	  suppression	  is	  found	  over	  central	  cortical	  regions	  
when	  observing	  and	  executing	  actions,	  but	  it	  may	  not	  reflect	  the	  activity	  of	  MNs.	  First,	  the	  functional	  
significance	  of	  lower	  band	  EEG	  activity	  is	  poorly	  understood	  even	  in	  adults,	  and	  is	  yet	  more	  difficult	  
to	  interpret	  in	  infants	  where,	  for	  example,	  less	  information	  is	  available	  about	  the	  source	  (Marshall	  &	  
Meltzoff,	  2011).	  Alpha	  suppression	  in	  other	  locations	  is	  interpreted	  differently	  (e.g.	  as	  evidence	  of	  
increased	  visual	  processing)	  and	  the	  only	  neonatal	  action	  observation	  study	  (Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  has	  
insufficient	  spatial	  resolution	  to	  provide	  source	  information.	  	  Second,	  adult	  studies	  have	  traced	  the	  
likely	  source	  of	  alpha	  suppression	  during	  action	  execution	  to	  the	  somatosensory	  cortex	  (Hari	  &	  
Salmelin,	  1997),	  suggesting	  that	  alpha	  suppression	  during	  action	  observation	  may	  not	  index	  motor	  
processing	  (and	  thus	  MNs)	  at	  all	  (Coll	  et	  al.,	  submitted).	  	  Third,	  even	  if	  alpha	  suppression	  does	  index	  
motor	  processing,	  it	  does	  not	  show	  that	  the	  motor	  activation	  matches	  or	  mirrors	  the	  observed	  
actions	  (Marshall	  &	  Meltzoff,	  2011).	  	  Thus,	  alpha	  suppression	  during	  observation	  of	  lip-­‐smacking,	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which	  has	  been	  reported	  in	  neonatal	  monkeys	  (Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  may	  reflect	  a	  generalized	  
readiness	  to	  act,	  or	  motor	  activation	  of	  tongue	  protrusion	  or	  hand	  movement,	  rather	  than	  motor	  
activation	  of	  lip-­‐smacking.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  shown	  that	  alpha	  suppression	  occurs	  when	  
infants	  have	  had	  insufficient	  correlated	  sensorimotor	  experience	  to	  build	  MNs	  through	  associative	  
learning.	  	  Indeed,	  studies	  of	  human	  infants	  suggest	  an	  age-­‐related	  trend	  consistent	  with	  the	  
associative	  account:	  for	  example,	  Nyström	  (2008)	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  alpha	  suppression	  when	  6-­‐
month-­‐old	  infants	  observed	  actions,	  but	  effects	  have	  been	  obtained	  at	  nine	  and	  14	  months	  
(Marshall,	  Young,	  &	  Meltzoff,	  2011;	  Southgate	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  although	  MN	  activity	  in	  newborns	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  
associative	  model,	  the	  associative	  account	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  ‘wealth	  of	  the	  stimulus’	  argument,	  and	  
therefore	  anticipates	  MN	  activity	  in	  young	  infants	  following	  sufficient	  correlated	  sensorimotor	  
experience	  (Ray	  &	  Heyes,	  2011).	  	  This	  ‘wealth	  argument’	  points	  out	  that	  typical	  human	  
developmental	  environments	  contain	  multiple	  sources	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  correlated	  sensorimotor	  
experience	  necessary	  to	  build	  MNs;	  that	  each	  of	  these	  sources	  is	  rich;	  and	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  
associative	  learning	  can	  make	  swift	  and	  efficient	  use	  of	  these	  sources.	  	  The	  range	  of	  sources	  
available	  to	  young	  human	  infants	  includes	  self-­‐observation,	  being	  imitated	  by	  adults,	  being	  
rewarded	  by	  adults	  for	  imitation,	  and	  acquired	  equivalence	  experience	  in	  which,	  for	  example,	  the	  
infant	  hears	  the	  same	  tapping	  sound	  when	  she	  hits	  an	  object	  herself	  and	  when	  she	  sees	  the	  object	  
hit	  by	  another	  person.	  	  A	  common	  misconception	  about	  associative	  learning	  is	  that	  it	  always	  occurs	  
slowly.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  when	  contingency	  is	  high,	  infants	  can	  learn	  action-­‐effect	  associations	  in	  just	  
a	  few	  trials	  (Paulus	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Verschoor	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  human	  adults	  demonstrate	  rapid	  learning	  
even	  with	  complex	  contingencies	  (e.g.,	  Baker,	  Vallée-­‐Tourangeau,	  &	  Murphy,	  2000).	  	  	  
	  




The	  associative	  account	  has	  been	  explicitly	  tested	  in	  experiments	  examining	  the	  effects	  of	  
laboratory-­‐based	  sensorimotor	  training	  on	  MNs	  in	  human	  adults.	  	  Building	  on	  the	  results	  of	  more	  
naturalistic	  studies	  (Calvo-­‐Merino	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  2006;	  Ferrari	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Vogt	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  these	  
experiments	  have	  isolated	  the	  effects	  of	  sensorimotor	  experience	  from	  those	  of	  purely	  visual	  and	  
purely	  motor	  experience.	  	  Using	  all	  the	  measures	  of	  MN	  activity	  commonly	  applied	  to	  humans	  
(imitation,	  motor	  evoked	  potentials,	  and	  fMRI	  measures	  including	  repetition	  suppression),	  they	  have	  
shown	  that	  relatively	  brief	  periods	  of	  sensorimotor	  experience	  can	  enhance	  (Press,	  Gillmeister,	  &	  
Heyes,	  2007),	  abolish	  (Cook	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Cook	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Gillmeister	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Heyes	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  
Wiggett	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  reverse	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Catmur,	  Walsh,	  &	  Heyes,	  
2007;	  Cavallo	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  and	  induce	  (Landmann	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Petroni,	  Baguear,	  &	  Della-­‐Maggiore,	  
2010;	  Press	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  MN	  activity	  (details	  below).	  These	  findings	  reveal	  the	  kind	  of	  flexibility	  one	  
would	  expect	  if	  MNs	  are	  forged	  by	  sensorimotor	  associative	  learning.	  	  In	  contrast,	  this	  kind	  of	  
flexibility	  is	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  adaptation	  account.	  	  If	  MNs	  were	  a	  genetic	  adaptation,	  one	  
would	  expect	  their	  development	  to	  be	  protected	  or	  ‘buffered’	  against	  environmental	  perturbations	  
that	  were	  occurring	  when	  MNs	  evolved	  and	  that	  could	  interfere	  with	  their	  adaptive	  function	  
(Cosmides	  &	  Tooby,	  1994;	  Pinker,	  1997).	  	  Thus,	  if	  MNs	  are	  indeed	  an	  adaptation	  for	  ‘action	  
understanding’,	  their	  development	  should	  be	  buffered	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  coding	  stimulus-­‐
response	  and	  response-­‐outcome	  relationships	  that	  could	  interfere	  with	  that	  function.	  For	  example,	  
MNs	  should	  be	  prevented	  from	  coding	  inanimate,	  rather	  than	  action,	  stimuli;	  and	  from	  coding	  
dissimilar,	  rather	  than	  similar,	  observed	  and	  executed	  actions.	  	  	  
	  
Evidence	  that	  MNs	  are	  not	  resistant	  to	  coding	  inanimate	  stimuli	  comes	  from	  studies	  showing	  that	  
arbitrary	  sound,	  color	  and	  shape	  stimuli	  can	  induce	  mirror	  motor	  evoked	  potentials	  	  (D’Ausilio	  et	  al.,	  
2006;	  Petroni	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  fMRI	  responses	  (Landmann	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Press	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  and	  
behavioral	  effects	  (Press	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  following	  sensorimotor	  training.	  	  For	  example,	  Press	  and	  
colleagues	  (2007)	  gave	  participants	  approximately	  50	  minutes	  of	  sensorimotor	  training	  in	  which	  they	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repeatedly	  opened	  their	  hand	  when	  seeing	  a	  robotic	  pincer	  open,	  and	  closed	  their	  hand	  when	  seeing	  
the	  robotic	  pincer	  close.	  	  Prior	  to	  this	  training,	  the	  pincer	  movement	  elicited	  less	  automatic	  imitation	  
than	  human	  hand	  movement,	  but	  24	  hours	  after	  training,	  the	  automatic	  imitation	  effect	  was	  as	  
strong	  for	  the	  pincer	  movement	  as	  for	  the	  human	  hand.	  	  	  
	  
Evidence	  that	  MNs	  are	  not	  resistant	  to	  coding	  dissimilar	  actions	  comes	  from	  studies	  showing	  that	  
non-­‐matching	  (or	  ‘counter-­‐mirror’)	  sensorimotor	  training	  abolishes	  automatic	  imitation	  (Cook	  et	  al.,	  
2012;	  Cook	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Gillmeister	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Heyes	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Wiggett	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  and	  
reverses	  both	  fMRI	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  and	  MEP	  mirror	  responses	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  For	  
example,	  Catmur	  and	  colleagues	  (2007)	  gave	  participants	  approximately	  90	  minutes	  of	  non-­‐
matching	  sensorimotor	  training	  in	  which	  they	  repeatedly	  made	  an	  index	  finger	  movement	  while	  
observing	  a	  little	  finger	  movement,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  Before	  this	  training	  they	  showed	  mirror	  MEP	  
responses.	  	  For	  example,	  observation	  of	  index	  finger	  movement	  elicited	  more	  activity	  in	  an	  index	  
finger	  muscle	  than	  observation	  of	  little	  finger	  movement,	  and	  vice	  versa	  for	  the	  little	  finger	  muscle.	  	  
After	  training,	  this	  pattern	  was	  reversed.	  	  For	  example,	  observation	  of	  index	  finger	  movement	  
elicited	  more	  activity	  in	  the	  little	  finger	  muscle	  than	  observation	  of	  little	  finger	  movement.	  Similarly,	  
following	  sensorimotor	  training	  in	  which	  observation	  of	  hand	  actions	  was	  paired	  with	  execution	  of	  
foot	  actions	  and	  vice	  versa,	  fMRI	  responses	  to	  action	  observation	  were	  reversed:	  premotor	  and	  
parietal	  areas	  normally	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  sight	  of	  hand	  actions	  now	  showed	  stronger	  
responses	  to	  observation	  of	  foot	  actions	  (Catmur	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
	  
Thus,	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  evidence	  from	  studies	  of	  training	  and	  expertise	  has	  confirmed	  the	  
predictions	  of	  the	  associative	  account,	  showing	  that	  mirror	  responses	  can	  be	  changed	  in	  radical	  ways	  
by	  sensorimotor	  learning.	  	  In	  particular,	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  MNs	  are	  not	  buffered	  or	  
protected	  against	  sensorimotor	  experience	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  makes	  them	  code	  inanimate	  stimuli	  and	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The	  associative	  account	  suggests	  that	  MNs	  do	  not	  have	  a	  specific	  biological	  purpose	  or	  ‘adaptive	  
function’,	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  other	  neurons	  with	  visuomotor	  properties.	  	  However,	  the	  associative	  
account	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  MNs	  are	  recruited	  in	  the	  course	  of	  development	  to	  
contribute	  to	  one	  or	  more	  ‘psychological	  functions’.	  	  They	  could	  be	  useful	  –	  possibly	  they	  could	  
contribute	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  functions	  –	  without	  having	  been	  designed	  by	  evolution	  for	  a	  
particular	  use.	  	  Thus	  the	  associative	  account	  is	  functionally	  permissive;	  however,	  it	  implies	  that	  a	  
radically	  new	  approach	  is	  required	  to	  find	  out	  what,	  if	  anything,	  MNs	  contribute	  to	  social	  behavior.	  	  
	  
	  
Theories	  relating	  to	  MN	  function	  have	  mainly	  been	  inspired	  by	  ‘reflection’	  on	  the	  field	  properties	  of	  
MNs	  found	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  laboratory	  monkeys	  with	  unreported	  (and	  possibly	  unknown)	  
developmental	  histories.	  	  This	  method	  asks	  what	  neurons	  with	  these	  field	  properties	  might	  enable	  
the	  animal	  to	  do.	  	  For	  example,	  early	  reports	  that	  MNs	  discharged	  when	  monkeys	  saw	  and	  produced	  
object-­‐directed	  actions	  inspired	  the	  theory	  that	  MNs	  mediate	  action	  understanding’	  via	  ‘motor	  
resonance’.	  	  Even	  now,	  opposition	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  MNs	  mediate	  action	  understanding	  tends	  to	  be	  
answered	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  fire	  (Gallese	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  The	  associative	  
account	  suggests	  that	  the	  ‘reflection’	  method	  needs	  to	  be	  changed	  and	  extended	  by	  embedding	  
mirror	  neuron	  research	  in	  system-­‐level	  theories	  of	  social	  behavior,	  by	  considering	  individuals’	  
developmental	  history,	  and	  by	  carrying	  out	  experimental	  investigation	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  function.	  
	  
If	  MNs	  were	  an	  adaptation,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  new	  categories	  of	  psychological	  functioning	  –	  such	  
as	  ‘action	  understanding’	  and	  ‘motor	  resonance’	  -­‐	  are	  necessary	  to	  characterize	  what	  they	  do.	  In	  
contrast,	  by	  showing	  that	  established	  psychological	  theory	  –	  associative	  learning	  theory	  -­‐	  can	  cast	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light	  on	  the	  origin	  of	  MNs,	  the	  associative	  account	  underlines	  the	  value	  of	  embedding	  research	  on	  
MN	  function	  within	  system-­‐level	  psychological	  and	  computational	  theories	  of	  how	  the	  brain	  
produces	  behavior.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  hypotheses	  about	  MN	  function	  should	  specify	  a	  part	  in	  a	  
process	  –	  a	  process	  that	  goes	  all	  the	  way	  from	  peripheral	  sensory	  input	  to	  overt	  motor	  output	  -­‐	  that	  
MNs	  are	  thought	  to	  fulfill.	  	  The	  name	  assigned	  to	  this	  part	  is	  not	  important	  in	  itself.	  What	  is	  
important	  is	  that	  the	  hypothetical	  function	  of	  MNs	  is	  distinguished	  clearly	  from	  other	  components	  of	  
the	  same	  overall	  process.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  system-­‐level,	  theory-­‐guided	  approach,	  ‘action	  
understanding’	  would	  be	  distinguished	  from	  components	  that	  are	  more	  purely	  perceptual	  (which	  
might	  be	  called	  ‘action	  perception’	  or	  ‘action	  recognition’),	  more	  purely	  motoric	  (e.g.	  ‘action	  
execution’),	  or	  constitute	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  ‘understanding’	  (e.g.	  mentalising).	  	  This	  approach	  would	  
also	  make	  it	  clear	  whether	  the	  hypothetical	  function	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  optional	  or	  obligatory;	  whether	  
it	  can	  be,	  or	  must	  be,	  done	  by	  MNs.	  	  The	  kind	  of	  system-­‐level	  theoretical	  approach	  required	  in	  
research	  on	  the	  functions	  of	  MNs	  is	  exemplified	  by	  studies	  of	  their	  role	  in	  speech	  perception	  (Lotto,	  
Hickok,	  &	  Holt,	  2009;	  Scott,	  McGettigan,	  &	  Eisner,	  2009).	  	  	  
	  
Regarding	  MN	  development,	  if	  MNs	  were	  an	  adaptation,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  their	  properties	  would	  be	  
relatively	  invariant	  across	  developmental	  environments.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  make	  
valid	  inferences	  about	  species-­‐typical	  properties	  of	  MNs	  based	  on	  a	  relatively	  small	  and	  
developmentally	  atypical	  sample	  of	  individuals.	  	  	  If	  MNs	  are	  instead	  a	  product	  of	  associative	  learning,	  
this	  kind	  of	  inference	  is	  not	  valid.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  an	  individual	  has	  MNs,	  which	  actions	  are	  encoded	  
by	  their	  MNs,	  and	  at	  what	  level	  of	  abstraction,	  will	  all	  depend	  on	  the	  types	  of	  sensorimotor	  
experience	  received	  by	  the	  individual	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  development.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  associative	  
account	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  for	  studies	  of	  laboratory	  monkeys	  to	  report,	  and	  ideally	  to	  control,	  
the	  animals’	  developmental	  history;	  the	  kinds	  of	  sensorimotor	  experience	  to	  which	  they	  have	  been	  
exposed.	  	  A	  corollary	  of	  this	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	  the	  mirror	  mechanisms	  found	  in	  the	  
members	  of	  one	  human	  culture	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  whole	  human	  species.	  	  With	  its	  emphasis	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on	  the	  role	  of	  social	  practices	  in	  driving	  the	  development	  of	  MNs,	  the	  associative	  account	  provides	  
specific,	  theory-­‐driven	  motivation	  for	  cross-­‐cultural	  studies	  of	  mirroring.	  	  	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  function,	  a	  system-­‐level	  theoretical	  approach	  would	  overcome	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  
haunted	  discussions	  of	  the	  action	  understanding	  hypothesis	  since	  MNs	  were	  discovered:	  Is	  this	  
hypothesis	  claiming	  that	  MN	  activity	  causes	  or	  constitutes	  action	  understanding?	  	  The	  former	  is	  an	  
empirically	  testable	  hypothesis	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinctive	  behavioral	  competence,	  called	  
action	  understanding,	  to	  which	  the	  activity	  of	  MNs	  contributes.	  	  The	  latter	  implies	  that	  the	  firing	  of	  
MNs	  during	  action	  observation	  is,	  in	  itself,	  a	  form	  of	  action	  understanding;	  it	  does	  not	  need	  to	  have	  
further	  consequences	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  action	  understanding.	  	  This	  claim	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  
empirical	  evaluation;	  it	  is	  true,	  or	  otherwise,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  words.	  	  
	  
Empirical	  (rather	  than	  constitutive)	  claims	  about	  the	  function	  of	  MNs	  need	  to	  be	  tested	  by	  
experiments	  looking	  for,	  at	  minimum,	  covariation	  between	  MN	  activity	  and	  behavioral	  competence,	  
and,	  ideally,	  testing	  for	  effects	  on	  behavioral	  competence	  of	  interventions	  that	  change	  MN	  activity.	  	  
At	  present,	  this	  research	  faces	  two	  major	  challenges.	  	  First,	  because	  the	  hypothetical	  functions	  of	  
MNs	  typically	  are	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  system-­‐level	  theory,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  design	  
appropriate	  control	  tasks.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  an	  experiment	  is	  testing	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  MNs	  play	  a	  
causal	  role	  in	  action	  understanding,	  should	  it	  control	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  instead	  play	  some	  
role	  in	  action	  perception?	  	  If	  so,	  what	  kind	  of	  behavioral	  competence	  is	  indicative	  of	  action	  
perception	  rather	  than	  action	  understanding?	  	  To	  date,	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  studies	  (e.g.	  Pobric	  &	  
Hamilton,	  2006)	  have	  made	  a	  serious	  attempt	  to	  tackle	  this	  problem.	  	  	  The	  second	  challenge	  is	  that,	  
with	  rare	  exceptions	  (Mukamel	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  MN	  activity	  cannot	  be	  localized	  precisely	  within	  the	  
human	  brain.	  	  Consequently,	  many	  studies	  assume	  that	  activity	  in	  the	  ventral	  PMC	  and	  IPL	  –	  areas	  
homologous	  to	  those	  in	  which	  MNs	  have	  been	  found	  in	  macaques	  –	  is	  MN	  activity,	  and	  that	  
behavioral	  changes	  brought	  about	  through	  interference	  with	  the	  functioning	  of	  these	  areas	  are	  due	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to	  interference	  with	  MNs.	  	  This	  is	  unsatisfactory	  because,	  in	  macaques,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  fewer	  than	  
20%	  of	  the	  neurons	  in	  these	  classical	  mirror	  areas	  are	  actually	  MNs,	  and	  because	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  
MNs	  in	  nonclassical	  areas	  in	  both	  macaques	  and	  humans	  (see	  first	  section).	  Techniques	  such	  as	  fMRI	  
repetition	  suppression,	  MVPA,	  and	  TMS	  adaptation	  (Cattaneo	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Silvanto	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  hold	  
some	  promise	  as	  means	  of	  overcoming	  the	  localization	  problem	  with	  human	  participants,	  by	  
isolating	  behavioral	  effects	  to	  specific	  populations	  of	  neurons.	  Guided	  by	  system-­‐level	  theory,	  future	  
studies	  could	  use	  these	  techniques	  with	  a	  range	  of	  tasks	  to	  isolate	  the	  processes	  in	  which	  MNs	  are	  
involved.	  
	  
Alongside	  such	  future	  studies	  with	  human	  participants,	  animal	  studies	  could	  be	  conducted,	  not	  only	  
to	  document	  the	  field	  properties	  of	  MNs,	  but	  to	  examine	  how	  those	  properties	  relate	  to	  behavioral	  
competence.	  	  For	  example,	  are	  animals	  with	  MNs	  for	  actions	  X	  and	  Y	  better	  than	  other	  animals	  of	  
the	  same	  species	  at	  behavioral	  discrimination	  of	  X	  and	  Y,	  or	  at	  imitating	  X	  and	  Y?	  	  Studies	  of	  this	  kind	  
have	  been	  dismissed	  as	  impractical	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  involve	  monkeys,	  
and	  that	  between-­‐group	  variation	  in	  MN	  activity	  would	  have	  to	  be	  induced	  via	  lesions	  or	  disruptive	  
TMS.	  	  However,	  the	  associative	  account	  suggests	  that	  between-­‐group	  variation	  in	  the	  number	  and	  
type	  of	  MNs	  could	  be	  induced	  using	  sensorimotor	  training,	  either	  in	  monkeys	  or	  by	  establishing	  a	  
rodent	  model.	  If	  the	  associative	  account	  is	  correct,	  rodents,	  birds,	  and	  other	  animals	  are	  likely	  to	  
have	  the	  potential	  to	  develop	  MNs	  because	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  associative	  learning.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  
they	  receive	  in	  the	  course	  of	  typical	  development	  the	  sensorimotor	  experience	  necessary	  to	  realize	  




The	  associative	  account	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  MN	  properties	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  
MN	  research.	  It	  acknowledges	  that	  MNs	  were	  a	  fascinating	  discovery,	  and	  is	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	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that	  they	  play	  one	  or	  more	  important	  roles	  in	  social	  interaction.	  	  It	  differs	  from	  the	  adaptation	  
account	  in	  suggesting	  that	  sensorimotor	  learning	  plays	  a	  crucial,	  inductive	  role	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  MNs,	  and,	  because	  of	  this,	  we	  will	  get	  reliable	  information	  about	  the	  function	  of	  MNs	  only	  by	  
applying	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  system-­‐level	  theory,	  developmental	  history,	  and	  experimentation.	  	  	  
These	  methodological	  implications	  underline	  the	  fact	  that,	  relative	  to	  the	  adaptation	  account,	  the	  
associative	  account	  shifts	  the	  balance	  of	  explanatory	  power	  from	  MNs	  themselves	  to	  the	  
environments	  in	  which	  they	  develop.	  	  In	  some	  ways	  this	  is	  inconvenient	  because	  developmental	  
environments	  are	  much	  harder	  to	  study	  in	  the	  laboratory,	  but	  there	  are	  significant	  potential	  payoffs.	  	  
As	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  testable	  predictions	  about	  when,	  where	  and	  how	  MNs	  develop,	  associative	  
learning	  theory	  can	  provide	  clear	  guidance	  for	  future	  research	  on	  the	  taxonomic	  distribution,	  typical	  
properties	  and	  functional	  roles	  of	  MNs.	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Figure	  1:	  Mirror	  neuron	  areas	  in	  A)	  the	  macaque	  and	  B),	  C)	  the	  human	  brain.	  These	  are	  areas	  in	  
which	  there	  is	  evidence	  at	  the	  single-­‐cell	  or	  population	  level	  of	  neurons	  with	  sensorimotor	  matching	  
properties.	  PMC,	  premotor	  cortex;	  IPL,	  inferior	  parietal	  lobule;	  IFG,	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus.	  
Figure	  2:	  Types	  of	  mirror	  neuron	  in	  the	  macaque.	  Typical	  sensory	  properties	  of	  four	  different	  types	  
of	  sensorimotor	  neuron	  are	  shown;	  for	  simplicity,	  the	  same	  motor	  property	  (a	  precision	  grip)	  is	  
shown	  for	  each	  mirror	  neuron	  type.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Mirror	  neurons	  from	  associative	  learning.	  A)	  Before	  learning,	  sensory	  neurons	  encoding	  
visual	  descriptions	  of	  observed	  action	  are	  not	  systematically	  connected	  to	  motor	  neurons	  in	  parietal	  
and	  premotor	  areas	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  similar	  actions.	  B,	  a-­‐d)	  Through	  social	  interaction	  
and	  self-­‐observation	  in	  the	  course	  of	  typical	  development,	  agents	  receive	  correlated	  sensorimotor	  
experience;	  they	  see	  and	  do	  the	  same	  action	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time	  (contiguity),	  with	  one	  event	  
predicting	  the	  other	  (contingency).	  This	  experience	  produces	  correlated	  activation	  of	  sensory	  and	  
motor	  neurons	  coding	  similar	  actions,	  and,	  through	  associative	  learning,	  C)	  strengthens	  connections	  
between	  these	  neurons.	  	  Due	  to	  these	  connections,	  neurons	  that	  were	  once	  involved	  only	  in	  the	  
execution	  of	  action	  will	  also	  discharge	  during	  observation	  of	  a	  similar	  action;	  motor	  neurons	  become	  
mirror	  neurons.	  Figure	  reproduced	  with	  permission	  from	  Heyes	  (2010).	  
Figure	  4:	  Examples	  of	  contingencies	  which	  would	  produce	  A)	  strictly	  congruent,	  B)	  broadly	  
congruent,	  and	  C)	  context-­‐dependent	  (‘grasp-­‐to-­‐place’)	  mirror	  neurons.	  A)	  When	  a	  monkey	  watches	  
its	  own	  actions	  while	  feeding,	  alone	  or	  in	  a	  group,	  the	  probability	  of	  seeing	  a	  particular	  grip	  (e.g.,	  a	  
precision	  grip)	  while	  performing	  exactly	  the	  same	  grip	  is	  high.	  	  B)	  When	  a	  monkey	  watches	  the	  
actions	  of	  others	  during	  group	  feeding,	  the	  probability	  of	  seeing	  a	  range	  of	  grasping	  actions	  while	  
performing	  a	  particular	  (e.g.,	  precision)	  grip	  is	  also	  high	  (and,	  crucially,	  it	  is	  higher	  than	  the	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probability	  of	  seeing	  an	  unrelated	  action	  e.g.	  a	  kick).	  C)	  Before	  testing	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘grasp-­‐to-­‐
place’	  mirror	  neurons,	  monkeys	  are	  trained:	  i)	  when	  a	  pot	  is	  not	  present,	  food	  items	  should	  be	  
eaten,	  but	  ii)	  when	  a	  pot	  is	  present,	  food	  items	  should	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  pot	  (in	  return	  for	  a	  higher-­‐
value	  food	  reward).	  Self-­‐observation	  during	  this	  training	  ensures	  that,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  pot,	  the	  
probability	  of	  seeing	  a	  grasp-­‐to-­‐place	  action	  while	  performing	  a	  grasp-­‐to-­‐place	  action	  is	  high.	  
Subsequently,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  pot,	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  grasping	  action	  activates	  grasp-­‐to-­‐place	  (rather	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